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Abstract 
 
In an ideal world, organizations “share” 
the cloud, logically separated from each 
other by the cloud provider, operating 
independently of each other in a sandbox, 
pulling resources only when needed, and 
respecting the separation put in place by 
the cloud provider. In the real world, 
applications uploaded to the cloud are 
trying to break out of their sandbox, 
attempting to gain access to other 
applications and hardware and trying to 
consume resources. The attackers know 
they have complete control of what the 
cloud runs; they know cloud security is 
immature and developing. 
Cloud computing creates new security 
problems that must be dealt with in 
addition to the existing problems. 
This research line explores these security 
problems. 
Keywords: cloud computing, security, 
SaaS, PaaS, IaaS. 
 
 
Context 
 
This research line is part of the following 
research projects: 
 
 High Performance and High 
Availability Distributed Computing 
(Spanish: Computación Distribuida 
de Alto Rendimiento y 
Disponibilidad). Code: 24/N024. 
Secretaría de Ciencia y Tecnología, 
Universidad Nacional del Sur, 
Bahía Blanca, Argentina (2008-
2010). Project coordinator: Jorge R. 
Ardenghi. 
 Automatización de la Detección de 
Intrusos a partir te Políticas de 
Seguridad. Code: 24/ZN14. 
Secretaría de Ciencia y Tecnología, 
Universidad Nacional del Sur, 
Bahía Blanca, Argentina (2008-
2010). Project coordinator: Javier 
Echaiz. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Cloud computing is a model for enabling 
convenient, on-demand network access to 
a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service 
provider interaction. This cloud model 
promotes availability and is composed of 
five essential characteristics, three service 
models, and four deployment models. 
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Essential Cloud Characteristics 
On-demand self-service. A consumer can 
unilaterally provision computing capabili-
ties, such as server time and network 
storage, as needed automatically without 
requiring human interaction with each 
service’s provider. 
Broad network access. Capabilities are 
available over the network and accessed 
through standard mechanisms that 
promote use by heterogeneous thin or 
thick client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, 
laptops, and PDAs). 
Resource pooling. The provider’s 
computing resources are pooled to serve 
multiple consumers using a multi-tenant 
model, with different physical and virtual 
resources dynamically assigned and 
reassigned according to consumer 
demand. There is a sense of location 
independence in that the customer 
generally has no control or knowledge 
over the exact location of the provided 
resources but may be able to specify 
location at a higher level of abstraction 
(e.g., country, state, or datacenter). 
Examples of resources include storage, 
processing, memory, network bandwidth, 
and virtual machines. 
Rapid elasticity. Capabilities can be 
rapidly and elastically provisioned, in 
some cases automatically, to quickly scale 
out and rapidly released to quickly scale in. 
To the consumer, the capabilities 
available for provisioning often appear to 
be unlimited and can be purchased in any 
quantity at any time. 
Measured Service. Cloud systems 
automatically control and optimize 
resource use by leveraging a metering 
capability at some level of abstraction 
appropriate to the type of service (e.g., 
storage, processing, bandwidth, and 
active user accounts). Resource usage can 
be monitored, controlled, and reported 
providing transparency for both the 
provider and consumer of the utilized 
service. 
 
Service Models 
Cloud Software as a Service (SaaS). The 
capability provided to the consumer is to 
use the provider’s applications running on 
a cloud infrastructure. The applications 
are accessible from various client devices 
through a thin client interface such as a 
web browser (e.g., web-based email). The 
consumer does not manage or control the 
underlying cloud infrastructure including 
network, servers, operating systems, 
storage, or even individual application 
capabilities, with the possible exception of 
limited user-specific application 
configuration settings. 
Cloud Platform as a Service (PaaS). The 
capability provided to the consumer is to 
deploy onto the cloud infrastructure 
consumer-created or acquired applica-
tions created using programming 
languages and tools supported by the 
provider. The consumer does not manage 
or control the underlying cloud infra-
structure including network, servers, 
operating systems, or storage, but has 
control over the deployed applications 
and possibly application hosting environ-
ment configurations. 
Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). 
The capability provided to the consumer is 
to provision processing, storage, networks, 
and other fundamental computing 
resources where the consumer is able to 
deploy and run arbitrary software, which 
can include operating systems and 
applications. The consumer does not 
manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure but has control over 
operating systems, storage, deployed 
applications, and possibly limited control 
of select networking components (e.g., 
host firewalls). 
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Deployment Models 
Private cloud. The cloud infrastructure is 
operated solely for an organization. It may 
be managed by the organization or a third 
party and may exist on premise or off 
premise. 
Community cloud. The cloud infra-
structure is shared by several organiza-
tions and supports a specific community 
that has shared concerns (e.g., mission, 
security requirements, policy, and 
compliance considerations). It may be 
managed by the organizations or a third 
party and may exist on premise or off 
premise. 
Public cloud. The cloud infrastructure is 
made available to the general public or a 
large industry group and is owned by an 
organization selling cloud services. 
Hybrid cloud. The cloud infrastructure is a 
composition of two or more clouds 
(private, community, or public) that 
remain unique entities but are bound 
together by standardized or proprietary 
technology that enables data and 
application portability (e.g., cloud bursting 
for load-balancing between clouds). 
 
Cloud software takes full advantage of the 
cloud paradigm by being service oriented 
with a focus on statelessness, low 
coupling, modularity, and semantic 
interoperability. 
Next section summarizes the main 
security issues, once again we can see 
"there ain't no such thing as a free lunch”. 
 
 
2. Main Cloud Security Issues 
 
#1: All the Eggs in One Basket 
Moving data to a cloud service is the 
equivalent of "putting all the eggs in one 
basket". Not too long ago, we saw a 
perfect example of the worst-case 
scenario of doing just that. In 2009 social 
bookmarking site Ma.gnolia experienced a 
server crash that resulted in massive data 
loss , enough to shut down the service for 
good. Users' bookmarks were lost forever. 
 
While that incident may have had only a 
minimal impact on the world at large, 
there are other examples that were much 
worse, including that of online storage 
service MediaMax (also called The Linkup) 
which went out of business following a 
system administration error that deleted 
active customer data. Then there was the 
incident where Salesforce.com customers 
were locked out of their critical business 
applications during a service outage. 
Finally, we saw the Nokia's Ovi crash 
which resulted in three weeks of lost user 
data as contacts simply disappeared from 
people's phones. There were no backups 
in place, either. 
These incidents highlight some of the 
pitfalls that can come from trusting cloud 
services, and it's precisely for those 
reasons that enterprise IT is making the 
move at a much slower rate than 
consumers. This is especially true in 
heavily regulated industries where 
compliance is an issue. 
 
#2: Too Much Trust? 
 
If you want to set up a new instance on 
Amazon's Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) the 
first step is to create a new Amazon 
Machine Image (AMI) containing your 
applications, libraries, data, and other 
associated configuration settings. 
However, as an alternative, you could use 
a pre-configured templated image to get 
up and running quickly. There's only one 
problem with that, though. While Amazon 
has provided 47 machine images they 
built themselves, the remaining thousands 
images were build by other EC2 users. Can 
you really believe that all of these images 
were built securely? Basically, the 
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template directory is just a big archive of 
user (risky) generated content. 
 
#3: Reliance on Passwords 
 
Another issue with cloud computing 
services is that, despite the numerous 
protections built into a cloud service itself, 
any account is only as secure as the 
password used to access it. A recent 
example of the consequences of insecure 
passwords was seen during what has now 
become known as "Twittergate." The 
microblogging service Twitter had their 
online accounts accessed by a hacker and 
numerous sensitive corporate documents 
stolen. The documents were housed in 
Google's online web office service Google 
Docs. Although Google was not to blame 
for the break-in, the hack may not have 
ever occurred in the first place if 
documents were securely hosted on-site, 
behind a firewall. Instead, the entire 
company data was only one password 
crack away from discovery. 
Password cracking is not the only threat 
from what is seemingly becoming a more 
and more archaic system for logging into 
online services. Weak password recovery 
systems are an issue, too. Password 
resetting and other security mechanisms 
in the cloud are always going to be a weak 
link, as long as user-friendliness comes 
ahead of security in the cloud computing 
beauty stakes. Expecting regular joes to 
whip out a two-factor authentication 
device for use with a cloud-driven service 
just isn't realistic. 
But without more secure methods of 
gaining access to cloud services, users 
themselves are the weakest link. Of 
course, this issue is not new. IT 
administrators have struggled with users' 
lack of good security practices for years 
(in fact since computers required a 
password). However, the difference 
between a corporate network and an 
online account is that in a business 
environment, administrators can create 
server-enforced password policies that 
require users to make up passwords with 
certain minimum levels of complexity. 
They can also force users to reset their 
passwords on a regular basis. But in the 
cloud, a user could set their password to 
"123456" and never change it again. 
 
Some cloud vendors are beginning to 
offer security policy control for their 
applications which would allow an IT 
admin to create and enforce stricter 
policies (like a secure password policy, for 
instance). Today, though, this is an area 
where many cloud applications are still 
lacking. 
 
#4: Encrypting Data in the Cloud 
 
Many cloud providers do not offer 
encryption for their service. For example 
virtual machines don't always have 
enough access to the random numbers 
needed to properly encrypt data. The end 
result is that the very nature of virtual 
computing itself makes hacking simpler 
because it allows attackers to more easily 
guess the numbers used to generate the 
encryption keys. 
Of course this problem isn't an immediate 
threat to cloud computing, but it does 
require more research. 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
Is the cloud really all that bad? Is it any 
worse of a platform for computing than 
what we had before? Probably not. 
Although the cloud will provide a new set 
of challenges and threats to deal with - 
and these will be more prevalent in the 
early stages of the transition - it doesn't 
necessarily present threats that are that 
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dramatically worse than old-school on-site 
computing. 
In the end, some cloud vendors will step 
up and make their cloud applications 
more secure, layering in security policies, 
encryption and the like while doing their 
best to mitigate the single-point-of-failure 
issues. Those vendors will eventually be 
rewarded for their efforts as more users, 
and then businesses, adopt their platform. 
Those that ignore the security issues will 
soon fall out of favor. 
Today's cloud services may not be as 
secure as they should be, but in time they 
could easily rival any other computing 
platform. in fact, they may one day be 
considered more secure. Until then, 
though, users, and especially companies, 
should proceed with caution when 
moving to the cloud, making sure they're 
fully aware of not only the capabilities of 
the online service, but the risks as well. 
 
 
4. Research Line 
 
Considering the above issues it is clear 
cloud security is still immature. 
We are just starting a research line that 
integrates identity and access 
management in cloud computing in order 
to extend corporate security policies to 
this new computing paradigm. 
The idea is to improve the cloud 
infrastructure using industry standards 
and combining security policies and 
training programs, since the human factor 
is still the main security problem. 
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